Nearly
every professional sports team has had to face the reality that is rebuilding. Restarting once your current plan has been exhausted; rebooting because the talent isn’t coming to
fruition the way it was supposed to; mismanaging salaries; or losing long
tenured players that reach the end of their careers or effectiveness. All are issues that sports franchises have faced which eventually led to a rebuild.
While
we have seen teams like the Yankees continually reload by throwing money at the
highest priced free agents on the market, they have also shown that reckless
spending does not directly coincide with championships. Often, these hefty signings and acquisitions of high priced talent lead to the Yankees being handcuffed to these same players when their salary suddenly outweighs their production (see Alex
Rodriguez, Kevin Brown, Carl Pavano, etc.).
However, when it comes to rebuilding the Yankees are the exception not the rule. Most teams at
some point, whether due to the salary cap, underperforming players, or a myriad
of other reasons, must consider rebuilding.
And there are several ways that teams attempt to do it.
The All In
The "All In" approach is one that is daring and exciting, but does not produce consistent results. This approach happens when a team pushes all
of its hope, finances, and assets, in at one time, in hopes of pulling off a
championship season before having to dismantle their team for financial reasons. While this method can be fun and entertaining
in the short term for fans, it also often means having to completely restart
your team, win or lose, the following year.
Examples of the "All In" that have found
success include the ‘12 Baltimore Ravens and the
’97 & ’03 Florida Marlins. I say the
Florida Marlins because they have tried the "All In" once since they became the Miami Marlins only to see it fail miserably
forcing them to sell off every asset they had.
Before the name change however, the Marlins twice won the World Series
pushing all in. And in both cases they
had to dump many of their high priced players the following year.
In
1997, the Florida Marlins hired a high profile manager in Jim Leyland, and
signed big name free agents Bobby Bonilla, Moises Alou, and Alex Fernandez to lucrative
free agent contracts. They would join an
already strong team featuring staff ace Kevin Brown, Al Leiter, closer Robb
Nen, catcher Darren Daulton, outfielder Gary Sheffield, shortstop Edgar
Renteria, and pitcher Livan Hernandez.
This talented team earned a wild card berth, and eventually won the 1997
World Series.
However,
just days after the World Series was over, owner Wayne Huizenga claimed the
team took financial losses despite having won the World Series and began one of
the biggest and most well known fire sales in sports history. Huizenga traded away Alou, Brown, Sheffield,
Charles Johnson, and Bonilla all for much younger, much cheaper, and less
talented players. The team that took the
field in 1998 went on to produce a 54-108
record, the worst in the majors.
2003
saw a similar, although a little less drastic, victory followed by an
overhaul. After winning the World Series
this time, the Marlins traded Derrek Lee and lost closer Ugueth Urbina and team
leader Ivan Rodriguez to free agency.
Both of these seasons were seen as an ‘all in’ attempt by ownership that
paid off.
Similarly,
the Ravens won a Super Bowl by pushing all in, only to be forced to let many of
their best players walk the following year.
After an inspired victory in this past Super Bowl, the Ravens lost future
Hall of Famers Ray Lewis and Ed Reed to retirement and free agency
respectively. They were also forced to
trade star Wide Receiver Anquan Boldin to the 49ers. These were purely cost cutting moves, as the
Ravens had no financial flexibility due to their spending the previous
year. All told, the 2012 Ravens lost 8
starting players from their Super Bowl run.
This decrease in talent has led to a 3-4 start to the 2013 season, and a
significant decrease in overall playmaking ability.
These are examples of the All In paying off. Unfortunately, there are many more examples
of teams pushing all in only to fall short while still suffering the
consequences. The Washington Redskins of
2000, the Marlins of ’12, the Lakers of ’04, and the Red Sox of ’12 all pushed
money and assets in for a run only to see it fail causing them to retool the
following year; and there are many, many more.
The Drafting Method
This could also be called the “We’re Just Smarter than
You,” or the “I Knew it All Along” method, as all it really requires is simply
being right; a lot. But with the amount
of luck, or lack thereof, that is inevitable in sports; this method can’t
really be bottled or relied upon.
The idea behind this approach is simply to trust your own
ability to draft great talent. When a
team is bad enough, they will be rewarded with high draft selections. And then it is up to the team to decide how best to use them.
A team that is consistently bad usually coincides with the team being
consistently unproductive in the draft.
This past season, the Pittsburgh Pirates had a winning record for the
first time since 1992. For a long time,
they have relied mainly on the draft for their players, which leads one to
believe that either the players they are drafting onto their team are simply
not adequate, or they are just extremely unlucky. A deeper look at the drafts they have had indicate that it is the former.
As far as being unlucky, let’s spare the people of
Portland, Oregon by only briefly mentioning that they drafted Sam Bowie over
Michael Jordan, and Greg Oden over Kevin Durant. Both of these picks were considered logical
picks at the time. Looking back,
however, has caused many people in the City of Roses to ask, “What if…?”
The prime example of this strategy working, though, has
to be the Oklahoma City Thunder. Many
thought they were crazy when the then Seattle Supersonics traded away superstar
Ray Allen for a draft pick, becoming a team that was between mediocre and bad
for several seasons which also included a move to Oklahoma City. This is how the rebuild started,
however. Using only their draft picks,
from 2007 to 2009 the Thunder assembled a team of Kevin Durant, Russell
Westbrook, Serge Ibaka, and James Harden.
Meaning that, according to a recent survey,
this franchise drafted 3 of the top 5 current players in the NBA. That is excellent drafting.
Like the first method, however, this one seems to leave
more teams in the losing category than the championship one.
Responsible Rebuilding
There are also teams that are models of what could be
called ‘Responsible Rebuilding.’ These
teams seem to be consistently competitive while also being financially
responsible. History has shown us that
this is the most reliable and responsible way to build a franchise.
A
recent example of this is the St. Louis Cardinals. The Cardinals have made 4 World Series in the
last decade (2004, 2006, 2011, and 2013), winning the World Series in 2006 and
2011. This was not accomplished by free
spending, but by being fiscally responsible and building from within their own
system. The effectiveness of their
methods and the refusal to overpay and overextend players was proven when they
allowed Albert Pujols, a generational kind of talent, walk to the Anaheim
Angels instead of paying him the money many felt he was worth. They set a bar for how much they would offer,
the Angels offered more, Pujols walked.
Instead of overpaying for one player, the Cardinals invested long term
into their current system. This system
is a mixture of continually bringing up solid players from their deep farm
system, and finding bargains on the open market. How did it work out? The Cardinals made another World Series while
Pujols’ numbers greatly declined and the Angels missed the playoffs entirely.
In
fact, this method has become so successful and well known that it is often
referenced simply as the "Cardinals Way." The success of their farm
system is shown by the fact that this years team, currently competing in the
World Series, boasts 18 out of 25 players drafted and brought up by the
Cardinals. And while the current
Cardinals do have a few well paid players, none can really be described as
overpaid.
There are two more intriguing rebuilds that can be
categorized as responsible rebuilds that could end up paying massive dividends. And both of these teams happen to be from the
same city; the Houston Rockets and the Houston Astros. These teams have both, for different reasons,
undergone a rebuild that seems to be the envy of the other franchises in similar
situations.
Suffering from a history of gutting their farm system for
big name players that either left the team or didn’t pan out (Randy Johnson,
Carlos Beltran, Miguel Tejada, etc.), the Astros became a team that was not
overly competitive and also had one of the weakest minor league systems in
baseball. Knowing the position the team
was in; new ownership took notice of the previously mentioned Cardinals and saw
that they were doing things the right way.
So they hired Jeff Lunhow away from St. Louis to be their new GM and
began a complete rebuild.
Every asset that could net prospects was dealt for minor
league potential. They got rid of all
major salary and became the worst team in baseball.....for three consecutive
years. The result, however, was three
consecutive first overall picks and a completely replenished farm system that
Bleacher Report recently ranked
second overall. And while they have yet
to see most of this talent at the major league level, the Astros are building a
franchise that instead of being consistently mediocre with a chance to win, has
the potential to be consistently competitive year after year. And while I think other franchises will copy
the St. Louis model, Houston is the first to buy in and undergo a complete
overhaul to do it. And if we believe
what we hear from Houston, this is the way things are going to go for the
foreseeable future. Build a foundation
that can set you up for the future and don’t gamble for a one year run.
The Rockets reached their need for a rebuild from a
totally different path. They had built a
team that was supposed to contend for championships around the foundation of
Tracy McGrady and Yao Ming, but injuries to both of their superstars put them
in a place that haunts NBA owners and GM’s everywhere: basketball
purgatory. In this place resides teams
that are simultaneously too good for quality draft picks, and too bad for true
championship contention.
Upon the end of the TMac-Yao era, the Rockets finished
with the 9th seed in the western conference for three consecutive
years. Meaning they were the best team
that didn’t make the playoffs; good for the 14th overall pick in the
draft. This is a hard place to escape
from. What with no stars to lean on, and
no high draft picks to develop, it is a wonder anyone ever escapes this
purgatory.
Enter Daryl Morey.
A man known for his use of statistical knowledge and data, Morey put in
place a plan to rebuild the Rockets by compiling a huge bevy of assets and
young players. Unlike baseball, though,
assets like draft picks and young players are sometimes best used as trade bait
to catch a true superstar. So, like
other wise GM’s before him, he refused to overpay for good players; being
unwilling to offer ‘max’ money to players who aren’t max players (ie. Joe
Johnson, Rudy Gay, Carlos Boozer, Eric Gordon, etc.), just to be
competitive. Instead, he would wait and
bide his time until the right deal came along to snag a player worth max
money. By sticking to his plan, and with
a little luck, Daryl Morey not only grabbed one superstar worthy of a maximum
salary, he got two.
Implementing a beautiful mixture of frugal contracts, brilliant
drafts picks, and stockpiling future picks, Morey gained enough assets to be
perfectly primed to consummate a deal when the time was right.
The first opportunity came when the Oklahoma City Thunder
(fresh off a finals appearance) could not afford to keep all four of their star
players: Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook, Serge Ibaka, and James Harden. After
deciding to keep Ibaka over Harden, the Thunder were forced to look at the
trade market to prevent losing Harden for nothing. The Rockets, flush with tradable assets, were
more than happy to fill the role of trade partner. Thus, the Rockets landed Harden in what is
fast becoming one of the most lopsided trades in recent memory in Houston’s
favor.
The Rockets locked up Harden, only 23 at the time, long
term and were well on their way to contender status. But, due to the consistent frugality and
salary cap brilliance of their GM, they still had room to afford one more
maximum salary player. Already a young,
talented team on the rise, the Rockets attracted free agent Dwight Howard,
widely considered the best big man in the NBA, to leave the Los Angeles Lakers
and create a team in Houston that could be title contenders for years to come.
Daryl Morey’s ability to put together this team while
maintaining financial flexibility and still possessing a few assets for
potential future trades (Hello Omer Asik), is truly quite extraordinary.
Salary cap
extraordinaire David Weiner (@BimaThug),
recently wrote a piece with a brilliant and in depth look at this process and
takes a glance at where the Rockets are now, and moving forward on Clutchfans.net, the leading NBA fan site
of the Rockets, where he is a regular blogger.
Read it here.
There is no blueprint for rebuilding, as the situation
that every team comes from is different.
The ability to compete in the present while also building for the future
is a luxury that few have. But, judging
by the numbers and the recent history of different franchise’s approaches to rebuilding;
it seems fair to say that financial responsibility and the patience to build a
good foundation win out over the tactics of binge spending and robbing the
future for the present.
Occasionally, there is a team that swings for the fences
and wins it all; but more often than not, responsible rebuilding is a more
likely way to ensure a consistently competitive franchise for the long
haul.
